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COMPELLED SUBSIDIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
William Baude∗ & Eugene Volokh∗∗
INTRODUCTION
Sometimes the government compels people to pay money to organizations they oppose. A lawyer may be forced to fund a bar association,
a college student forced to fund student group activities, a public employee forced to fund a labor union. Unsurprisingly, people often bristle
at such compulsion. People don’t like having their money taken, and
knowing that it will be spent on causes they oppose seems to add insult
to injury. But when is it unconstitutional?
For over forty years, the Court has unanimously concluded that being required to pay money to a union, or to a state bar, is a serious
burden on one’s First Amendment rights.1 This burden, the Court has
held, is generally unconstitutional when the money is used for most
kinds of political advocacy.2
In Janus v. AFSCME,3 a majority of the Court went further and held
that requiring public employees to pay union agency fees is categorically
unconstitutional, even when the money is used for collective bargaining.4 Such public-sector collective bargaining, the majority held, is itself
inherently political.5 And the government interests in mandating such
payments don’t suffice to justify such requirements.6 There was a
strong dissent by four Justices, but as we discuss in Part I, we think the
majority had the better argument on both of these points.
But we think the majority — and for that matter the dissent, and
the opinions in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education7 and Keller v. State
Bar of California8 — erred on the preliminary point. The better view,
we think, is that requiring people only to pay money, whether to private
organizations or to the government, is not a First Amendment problem
at all. The employees in Janus were not compelled to speak or to associate. They were compelled to pay, just as we all are compelled to pay
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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1 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus v. AFSCME,
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
2 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36; Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
3 138 S. Ct. 2448.
4 See id. at 2486.
5 See id. at 2480.
6 Id. at 2465–69, 2477–78.
7 431 U.S. 209.
8 496 U.S. 1 (1990).

171

172

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:171

taxes; our having to pay taxes doesn’t violate our First Amendment
rights, even when the taxes are used for speech we disapprove of —
likewise with their having to pay agency fees. If we are right, as we
argue in Part II, then the result in Janus was wrong.
In Part III, we turn from evaluating the decision to anticipating its
consequences. We doubt Janus will have significant effects on government speech rights (section III.A), but it will likely forbid compelled
funding of other forms of private speech. Janus will likely extend to a
prohibition on state bar dues, at least so long as the bar is seen as sufficiently removed from other government agencies (section III.B). It
might also lead to constraints on student governments’ use of student
activity fees at public universities, though universities can create accounting workarounds that will practically allow such student activity
funding to continue (section III.C).
Finally, and perhaps most consequentially, Janus may lead to massive liability for unions that have collected the agency fees that are now
viewed as unconstitutional (section III.D). Though the fees were seen
as valid when collected, the Supreme Court’s precedents say that constitutional reversals in civil cases are generally retroactive, so everyone
in Janus’s shoes can get agency fee refunds just as Janus himself could
(at least so long as the statute of limitations has not run). Moreover,
private organizations such as unions are generally not entitled to qualified immunity or similar defenses. While the unions do have some possible arguments to mitigate the damages or try to claim a special form
of good faith, those defenses are speculative, and cannot be counted on.
I. PAYING IS SPEAKING
There are two ways of thinking about the constitutionality of compelled payments to others. One way would view them as a serious burden on First Amendment rights. The argument goes something like this:
A law that compels person A to give money to entity B is a compelled
contribution of money. Since restricting voluntary contributions of
money that will be used for speech itself restricts speech,9 compelling
people to give money that will be used for speech is like compelling
people to speak themselves.10 And compelling people to speak themselves is in turn like restricting their speech11 — maybe even worse.12
Thus, compelled subsidies raise serious First Amendment problems.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9
10
11
12

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (“It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than
silence.”).
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A. The Plausibility of Janus
Under this framing, the majority opinion in Janus is quite plausible,
and probably even correct. In Janus, the Court confronted the constitutionality of so-called “agency shop” laws in the public sector — laws
that compel state employees to pay for a union to represent them in
collective bargaining and other “chargeable” activities, even if the employees did not choose to join it and pay dues.13 Janus, in line with the
framing above, proceeded under the theory that compelling employees
to fund a union raised “First Amendment concerns”14 analogous to compelled speech or association.
If that framing is correct — if such laws raise serious First Amendment
concerns — then the laws are probably unconstitutional. To survive
First Amendment review, such laws would likely need to have a strong
justification (a “compelling interest”) and need to serve that justification
better than significantly less restrictive alternatives.15
It is not clear that there are any truly “compelling” interests in compelling employee support for public sector labor unions. Twenty-eight
states do not have any kind of agency fee arrangements for public employees and instead have a so-called “right to work.”16 That most states
have chosen to do without them weakens the claim of a “compelling”
interest, though perhaps not decisively.17
We also know that a compelling interest to justify compelled speech
must be “ideologically neutral.”18 In Wooley v. Maynard,19 a famous
compelled speech case that allowed drivers to tape over the motto on
their license plates, the Court rejected the state’s interests in “appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride” as “not ideologically neutral” and concluded that they could not justify compelled private
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
13
14
15

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460–61.
Id. at 2464.
See id. at 2464–65; Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2014); Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000,
567 U.S. 298, 309–10, 321–22 (2012).
16 Right-to-Work Resources, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZV44-PRVG].
17 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015), for instance, concluded that a prison grooming policy
failed strict scrutiny under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, in part because “the vast majority of States and the Federal Government” were content with a less restrictive
approach. Id. at 866. Query whether the same analysis would apply if states were split closer to
half and half, as was the case in Janus. See Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 203 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“That a majority of the States with nonpartisan Supreme Court elections have opted not to censor
their candidates in [the way challenged in that case] of course does not establish the invalidity of
the clause, but it does call into question the necessity of implementing Kentucky’s nonpartisan
judicial election system in this way and whether it amounts to the least restrictive means of protecting the Commonwealth’s interests.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
19 430 U.S. 705.
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speech.20 Public sector unions’ positions — and unionism generally —
seem to be as ideological as “individualism” or “state pride.”
In any event, even if one assumes (as the Court in Janus ultimately
did21) that public sector unions promote compelling state interests, we
would then look to whether less burdensome means are available. The
majority opinion concluded that simply abolishing agency fees will still
likely serve the government’s interests in labor peace and efficient bargaining just fine. Labor unions will still have an incentive to represent
nonmembers, the Court reasoned;22 and some individualized services
such as grievance representation could be denied to free riders.23
These predictions were debated by the dissent.24 But there was an
even stronger argument available to the majority, a less restrictive
means that would achieve all of the state’s goals and then some: Rather
than requiring employees to directly pay unions, the state itself could
instead pay the unions, out of state coffers. Instead of deducting an
agency fee from the employee’s paycheck and sending that to the union,
the state employer could simply reduce the employee’s salary by the
same amount — with no decrease in take-home pay — and pay that to
the union as a “labor relations contract fee.” Indeed, if the state employer believes that unions provide it valuable services, such as by promoting labor peace, improving employee morale, efficiently handling
labor-management disputes, and the like, then paying the unions directly for services rendered would be the logical, normal payment
mechanism.
Say, for instance, that state employees get an average of $25,000 a
year and then must choose whether to pay $600 of it in union dues, or
$500 in chargeable agency fees.25 Under the agency fee regime, the state
deducts $500 from each employee’s paycheck (though formally characterizing this as requiring each employee to pay the union $500). The
union thus collects $500 for each non-union employee, as well as $600
for each member. Under the direct payment alternative, the government
instead lowers the average wage to $24,500 a year. Union dues drop to
$100, and non-union members pay nothing. The government then gives
the money directly to the unions. The unions again collect $500 for each
non-union employee, as well as $600 for each dues-paying member. And

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id. at 716–17.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
Id. at 2467.
Id. at 2468–69.
Id. at 2490–91 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
These are rounded approximations of the numbers in Janus. See id. at 2461 (majority opinion); Joint Appendix at 332, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466).
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the employees continue to get the same net salaries as under the old
system.26
This alternative is revenue neutral for the state, so it avoids the questions confronted in cases like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,27
such as when the government must “assume the cost” of a new program
under least-restrictive-means analysis.28 And it accomplishes everything
legitimate that agency fees accomplished — funding the desired activities of public sector unions and avoiding free riding without (on net)
costing either the state or state employees a nickel. The majority does
not mention this alternative; but we think it would be constitutionally
permissible, and an adequate means for serving the government interest.
Now, some people (including us) have argued that the presence of
such alternatives should be a clue that there is nothing unconstitutional
about the agency fee arrangement and other compelled subsidies.29 But
it could cut the other way: if we accept the premise that compelled subsidies do work a serious First Amendment injury, then the availability
of this direct payment alternative just proves that it is an injury that is
wholly unnecessary to inflict, and therefore wholly unjustified.30
It is also true that there would be some transition costs in moving
from one regime to the other, and the details would vary by state. In
some states the alternative would require legislative change, in others
apparently not.31 But it seems unlikely that threatened transition costs
alone would be enough to make the program constitutional; at most they
would come into the consideration of stare decisis, which we won’t discuss here, fascinating though it is.
B. Janus Under Employee Speech Doctrine
Now, perhaps, even if we accept that compelled funding is compelled
speech, it would be subject to lesser scrutiny in the particular context of
government employment, where the Court has recognized that government employers have broader powers over employee speech than they
would over ordinary citizens.
But even in the public employment context, this kind of compelled
speech (if that’s what it is) would be difficult to uphold. The closest
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26 Actually, because of the federal tax treatment of union dues, they may get slightly net higher
salaries. See Daniel Hemel & David Louk, Is Abood Irrelevant?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE
227, 236–37 (2015).
27 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
28 Id. at 2780–81.
29 Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and William Baude as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 12, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466); Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the
First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1077 n.165 (2018).
30 See Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective
Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 197–204 (2016).
31 Hemel & Louk, supra note 26, at 248–49.
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precedents may well be the Supreme Court’s “political patronage” cases,
which protect almost all public employees from being required to join,
endorse, or contribute to a political party.32 Such requirements “severely
restrict political belief and association,” and cannot be justified under
strict scrutiny.33
While the government has undoubted power to discharge and discipline its government employees, the patronage cases nonetheless conclude that an employee’s job with the government “cannot properly be
conditioned upon his allegiance to [a] political party.”34 Indeed, the plurality in Elrod v. Burns35 expressly noted that “any assessment of [the
employee’s] salary is tantamount to coerced belief.”36
It has long been argued that public sector labor unions are also “inherently ‘political’”37 — even if one excludes their “nonchargeable” activities — and the choices that they lobby the government to make are
of great public importance.38 Compelling employees to endorse or expressly join unions would thus be as unconstitutional as compelling
them to endorse or join political parties. And if one accepts that compelled contributions are comparable to compelled speech or compelled
membership, then they would likely be unconstitutional as well — justifiable only if they pass strict scrutiny, which (as discussed above) would
be very difficult to do.
Even if we ignore the patronage cases and employ the laxer standard
of Pickering v. Board of Education,39 compelled expression in support
of unions is still likely unconstitutional. Under the Pickering framework, speech on a matter of public concern40 (and not part of one’s official job duties41) can be restricted only if “the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees” outweighs “the interests of the [employee],
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.”42
The test is not quite framed for compulsions of payment; it was designed for restrictions on speech. But if we apply it, both threshold
conditions appear to be met. Supporting a union is not exactly what
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32 See Tang, supra note 30, at 152–53. The exception is for narrow job categories where political
affiliation is seen as an important job criterion, for instance high-level decisionmakers. See Branti
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–18 (1980).
33 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Branti, 445 U.S. at 515–
16.
34 Branti, 445 U.S. at 519; see also Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355 (plurality opinion).
35 427 U.S. 347.
36 Id. at 355 (plurality opinion).
37 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977) (characterizing appellants’ argument).
38 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474–77.
39 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
40 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004).
41 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
42 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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state employees are “employed to do,” nor are their communications to
the union “official communications” or “official business.”43 As for “public concern,” public sector unions negotiate over many big-ticket issues
that affect government budgets and important government policies,44 as
well as individual grievances that are sometimes of private concern and
sometimes not.45 But the question is how to characterize compelled
support for the union itself. We could either try to split support for a
union into its “private concern” and “public concern” portions — a split
that would place a lot in the “public concern” category, given the public
significance of union actions — or we could conclude that all decisions
to support or not support a union are matters of public concern if they
relate in part to the big-ticket issues. And to the extent that these threshold tests are met, agency fees would likely fail the balancing test in light
of the direct payment alternative.
Perhaps for these reasons, the dissent in Janus tried to argue that
something even weaker than Pickering was the law: “If an employee’s
speech is about, in, and directed to the workplace, she has no possibility
of a First Amendment claim.”46 And elsewhere the dissent argued that
the “public concern” test from Pickering47 “is not, as the majority seems
to think, whether the public is, or should be, interested in a government
employee’s speech. Instead, the question is whether that speech is about
and directed to the workplace — as contrasted with the broader public
square.”48
But this overstates the government’s power under the employee
speech doctrine. In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District,49 the Court concluded that the First Amendment protected
speech by a schoolteacher to a principal (i.e., directed to someone in the
workplace),50 at school (in the workplace),51 about alleged race discrimination in the school (about the workplace).52 The Court specifically
rejected the school district’s claim that First Amendment protection “is
lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with
his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”53
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–23.
See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474–77.
See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
391 U.S. at 569–73.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2495 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 411–13.
Ayers v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Givhan,
439 U.S. 410.
52 Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412–13.
53 Id. at 415–16.
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Likewise, in Connick v. Myers,54 the Court concluded that speech by
an employee to coworkers, at work, about alleged “pressure[] to work in
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates” was on a
matter of public concern.55 The Connick Court concluded that the
speech could still be restricted on the facts of that particular case, because it was sufficiently disruptive to fail the Pickering test — but the
Court deliberately did not conclude that such in-, to-, and about-workplace speech was categorically unprotected.56
So whether seen through the general lens of compelled speech or the
specific lens of government employee speech, it is hard to justify the
First Amendment harms supposedly inflicted by agency fees.
C. Janus’s Widely Accepted Premise
Many thoughtful people have taken this general view — that compelled subsidies for speech raise serious First Amendment problems —
even if they have quibbled over its scope. It was the approach taken by
nearly every Justice in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.57 It was
unanimously extended to state bar associations in Keller v. State Bar of
California, thirteen years later.58 Before all that, it was forcefully argued
by both Justices Black59 and Douglas60 — who were certainly not right
about everything in their day, but who were sometimes visionary.61
Without explicitly putting it in First Amendment terms, a 1943 ACLUproposed “‘bill of rights’ for union members”62 likewise argued that “no
[union] member should be assessed for a political purpose which he does
not support.”63
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
54
55
56
57

461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 164.
431 U.S. 209, 222, 236 (1977); id. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Then-Justice
Rehnquist reiterated his view that the First Amendment protections for government employees
were weak and that the patronage cases were wrongly decided, but joined the majority anyway.
Id. at 242–44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
58 496 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1990).
59 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 871 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788–89 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
60 Street, 367 U.S. at 776–78 (Douglas, J., concurring).
61 The underlying argument traces at least as far back as Cecil B. DeMille’s 1944 California
challenge to use of union dues for political purposes. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 33–35, De Mille
v. Am. Fed’n of Radio Artists, Civ. 15067, 175 P.2d 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), aff’d, 187 P.2d
769 (Cal. 1947).
62 ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 68 (1943) (capitalization omitted).
63 Id. at 70; see also id. (“[I]f for political purposes the assessments should be wholly voluntary.”);
id. at 67 (asserting “the right of the minority not to be assessed” when unions “contribute funds to
political campaigns”). This proposal dealt with dues at private workplaces, id. at 66, not governmental ones (since public employees were generally not allowed to collectively bargain at the time,
see Developments in the Law — Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1676–77 (1984)); it
also called for “every possible pressure . . . exerted from within and without the labor movement to
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Even the dissent in Janus — which adopted a generally barnburning rhetorical approach — never really disputed this general view
of compelled subsidies as compelled speech. The dissent recites, without
disapproval, Abood’s concession of employee “First Amendment interests.”64 It then goes on to battle about the strength of the government’s
interests and the scope of employees’ free speech rights without ever
really denying that there are serious free speech rights at issue in the
first place.65 Scholars who challenge the Court’s compelled subsidy jurisprudence as incoherent or overbroad likewise often concede this view
in at least some measure, for instance arguing (1) that the subsidies
might be unconstitutional if they make it look like the subsidizers endorse the speech,66 (2) that there is a symmetry between the right to
contribute money and the right not to contribute,67 or (3) that compelled
subsidies “might work some infringement of freedom of conscience”
(though “slight”).68
The majority opinion in Janus has been and will be subjected to
quite strong critiques, not just as to its merits but as to its methodological legitimacy: some argue that the Justices are unprincipled hacks
who only profess to care about text and history when it suits them,69
that they are reviving Lochner to constitutionalize libertarian economic

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
induce unions to measure up to such standards,” but only pressures short of legislation, ACLU,
supra note 62, at 68–69. See also Clyde W. Summers, Union Powers and Workers’ Rights, 49 MICH.
L. REV. 805, 835–36 (1951) (concluding that “compulsory contribution to political causes” was “[a]
private poll tax” that was “difficult to justify”).
64 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 222 (1977)).
65 The dissent did cite our amicus brief, which challenged this premise, but without endorsing
or fully describing this part of our argument. See id. at 2494–95.
66 Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 218–20; see also David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against
Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1019–20 (1982) (allowing
this possibility, though arguing it is unlikely in the agency fee context).
67 Post, supra note 66, at 221–25; see also Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (2016) (“The better reading of the decision . . . is that Abood is the mirror image
of Buckley.”).
68 Gaebler, supra note 66, at 1022; see also David Luban, The Disengagement of the Legal Profession: Keller v. State Bar of California, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 185, 187 (arguing that because
“the actual amounts of money levied are rather small” the First Amendment interests are easily
outweighed by “unionism, which has been one of the mainstays of American society for over a
century”).
69 Andrew Strom, In Janus, the Court’s “Originalists” Show Their True Colors, ON LABOR
(June 29, 2018), https://onlabor.org/in-janus-the-courts-originalists-show-their-true-colors/ [https://
perma.cc/86XJ-PBF5].
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principles,70 that they are “weaponizing the First Amendment” (whatever precisely that might mean),71 and that they are “black-robed rulers
overriding citizens’ choices” at “every stop.”72 We think Janus is wrong
too, as we will explain, but this kind of criticism is both unfair and
insufficiently ambitious. The majority’s argument proceeds quite logically from a widely held and plausible premise about First Amendment
compelled speech. The case for the agency fees was lost when that
premise was accepted.
II. PAYING IS NOT SPEAKING
So if requiring someone “to contribute to the support of an ideological cause” (even just by paying money) interferes with “the freedom of
belief”73 protected by the First Amendment, then the Janus majority
was likely right: Abood would have been correct to recognize such a
right, and then wrong not to protect that right more fully. Janus is more
convincing than Abood in recognizing that collective bargaining — at
least for government employee unions bargaining with government officials over public funds — is “an ideological cause” that involves “a
political message”74 as well.
But there is another way to think about compulsory funding, one we
think is ultimately correct. Requiring someone to pay money is not requiring them to believe, to speak, or to associate, even if the money is
spent for political purposes. By itself, it does not implicate the First
Amendment, and does not require the government to try to use less restrictive alternatives. This means that Abood erred at its root, in recognizing such a right at all.
A. The Ubiquity of Compulsory Funding of Ideological Expression
Requiring people to pay money that can be used for speech with
which they disagree is utterly commonplace. If “to compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which
he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical,”75 then it’s sin and
tyranny that are everywhere in modern government. After all, each of
us must pay taxes that will in part go to spread opinions many of us
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70 Mark Joseph Stern, A New Lochner Era, SLATE (June 29, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://slate.
com/news-and-politics/2018/06/the-lochner-era-is-set-for-a-comeback-at-the-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/G9FP-WCKL].
71 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 2502.
73 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
74 Id. at 234.
75 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis omitted)).
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disbelieve and abhor — military recruiting campaigns, antidrug campaigns, publicity for or against abortion or contraception, public school
and university curricula, and a vast range of other messages.76
Justice Black in Lathrop v. Donohue77 insisted that he could “think
of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the First
Amendment than to compel persons to support,” among other things,
“ideologies or causes that they are against.”78 In a companion case,
International Association of Machinists v. Street,79 he condemned a law
“being used as a means to exact money from . . . employees . . . to support doctrines they are against.”80 But he never explained how this vision was consistent with the everyday reality of “exact[ion]” through taxation to support ideologies, causes, and doctrines — whether related to
tolerance, drugs, alcohol, crime, war, the environment, respect for the
law, or anything else — that some taxpayers “are against.”
The government cannot require us to say things as part of its programs. It generally cannot require us to display things on our property81
(except when it can82). But it can certainly require us to pay for speech
by others. You can refuse to say the Pledge of Allegiance, but you can’t
require the government to refund the portion of your taxes that it spends
on patriotic observances.
Perhaps because of this, the Court in Janus (unlike Justice Black)
was careful to condemn only “compelled subsidization of private
speech.”83 And in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n84 and Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,85 the
Court expressly made clear that the logic of Abood and similar cases
doesn’t apply to compelled funding of government speech.86
But having recognized that government speech can be funded by
taxes, we should have doubts about the Abood First Amendment argument in the first place. Why would the First Amendment distinguish
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in
Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 22–24 (1983); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Link
Between Student Activity Fees and Campaign Finance Regulations, 33 IND. L. REV. 435, 453–54
(2000); Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization,
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1111–17 (2005).
77 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
78 Id. at 873 (Black, J., dissenting).
79 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
80 Id. at 790 (Black, J., dissenting).
81 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376, 2378 (2018)
(holding that California could not require crisis pregnancy centers to post certain disclosures).
82 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 58–70 (2006)
(holding that Congress could require law schools to distribute information about where students
can find on-campus military recruiters).
83 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (emphasis added).
84 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
85 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
86 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559; Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
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compelling people to subsidize private speech from compelling people
to subsidize government speech? If compelled subsidy of private speech
somehow “undermines” “the search for truth,”87 the much larger compelled subsidy of government speech would do so at least as much. If
compelling people to subsidize private speakers’ ideas is “demeaning”
and “coerc[es them] into betraying their convictions,”88 then compelling
people to subsidize the government’s ideas is just as bad. That we accept such government compulsion without any constitutional qualm
suggests that compulsion to pay money, by itself, is not a constitutional
problem at all.89
In Abood, Justice Powell opined that compelled payment for speech
“of a private association is fundamentally different” from compelled
payment for government speech, because “the government is representative of the people,” while the private association “is representative only
of one segment of the population, with certain common interests.”90 But
why should it matter that “the government is representative of the people”? The First Amendment protects against majoritarian speech compulsions as much as against speech compulsions that favor one segment
of the population.
We don’t say, for instance, “requiring schoolchildren to say a pledge
of allegiance would be unconstitutional if the government delegated the
writing of a pledge to the Boy Scouts, but if the requirement is imposed
by a representative legislature, it’s just fine.” If compelled payment is
just as bad as compelled speech, then why should the presence of democratic decisionmaking — generally so inadequate to justify speech compulsions — legitimize compelled payments?
In Southworth, the Court likewise suggested that compulsory funding of government speech could be justified by the presence of “traditional political controls to ensure responsible government action” that
might be “sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.”91 But
the First Amendment isn’t limited to preventing “[ir]responsible government action.” The premise of the compelled subsidy cases is that requiring people to fund speech that they oppose unduly interferes with
their dignity and autonomy, not that the government may use people’s
money irresponsibly.
Indeed, consider the public employment contract negotiation itself.
Some employees may disapprove of the position being taken by a union
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
87
88
89

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
Id.
We also think the Court will continue to accept the compulsion without constitutional qualm
even after Janus. See infra section III.A, pp. 195–96.
90 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Post, supra note 66, at 225 (offering a similar analysis).
91 529 U.S. at 229.
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using their agency fees. But many employees may disapprove of the
position being taken by management using their tax dollars. If compulsory agency fees are allowed, compulsory payments are being used to
fund both sides of the negotiation. There is no First Amendment problem with the management negotiators speaking using compulsorily
raised funds. Why should there be a First Amendment problem with
the union negotiators speaking using compulsorily raised funds?92
Compulsory tax revenue also routinely ends up subsidizing private
speech. Tax money funds private artists (through National Endowment
for the Arts grants), private scientists (through National Science Foundation grants), public university professors writing law review articles
(through faculty salaries), and much more. All that speech may well
express private opinions that many taxpayers might reject; yet there is
no First Amendment problem with tax money being used this way.93
And if one defends such funding on the grounds that the funding to the
private speakers is still authorized by “the government[, which] is representative of the people” — well, the same is true of agency fees.
Another possible distinction is that most taxes go to a wide range of
uses, and come from a wide range of taxpayers; agency fees are narrower
in both respects. But we think the Court was quite right in Johanns to
conclude that this distinction can’t make a First Amendment difference.
In Johanns, the Court upheld a program in which the government
used money raised through “a targeted assessment on beef producers,
rather than by general revenues” to pay for generic beef advertising.94
“The compelled-subsidy analysis,” the Court held, “is altogether unaffected by whether the funds for the promotions are raised by general
taxes or through a targeted assessment.”95 “The First Amendment does
not confer a right to pay one’s taxes into the general fund, because the
injury of compelled funding . . . does not stem from the Government’s
mode of accounting.”96 We agree: there is no reason the government
should have less freedom to use, say, revenues from an excise tax on
alcohol or gasoline than revenues from a general income tax, property
tax, or sales tax.97
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92 We express no opinion on the policy arguments for why one side should be funded this way
and the other should not. But we see no good argument that the First Amendment allows compulsorily raised funds to be used by one side but not the other.
93 Perhaps some such grants might include conditions limiting the use of the funds for certain
political purposes, such as electioneering or lobbying. But such conditions are surely not required
by the First Amendment, even when they are allowed by it, and in any event they leave grant
recipients free to express many controversial but not election- or legislation-related opinions.
94 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
95 Id. (emphasis omitted).
96 Id. at 562–63.
97 If the tax itself discriminates against speech based on its content, or targets those with disfavored views, it would be unconstitutional on those grounds. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). But normal, content-

184

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:171

Nor can the First Amendment analysis reasonably turn on the narrowness of the purposes for which the tax is collected.98 For instance,
the nation is full of special-purpose districts that receive specially targeted property tax revenue: school districts, business improvement districts, public library districts, hospital districts, mosquito control districts, and many more. There is no reason why they should be more
constrained by the First Amendment than are cities, counties, states, or
the federal government. Whatever injury there might be — none, we
think — to a taxpayer whose money is spent to buy library books he
disapproves of, that injury is the same whether the books are paid for
by general income tax funds or by a property tax imposed on behalf of
a special library district.99 Likewise with special assessments to pay for
union negotiations or for bar programs.
B. The Irrelevance of Cutting Out the Government Middleman
Now many of the examples we gave involve money being taken from
objectors, placed in the treasury, and then sent to private recipients.
Agency fees, by contrast, at least formally flow from the objecting employees directly to the private union. Yet even this formal difference is
thin — both agency fees and taxes are usually withheld from one’s
paycheck and then routed by the government to the objectionable use.
And, more broadly, why should this formal difference matter? One
way or the other, objectors are required to fund speech they dislike.
That the government adds an extra step, where the government puts
the money in the treasury after taking it and before transferring it,
should not have First Amendment significance. Sometimes formal differences do matter in law — but usually they are significant for a reason,
whether practical, textual, or historical. As we’ve discussed, there is no
practical ground for a distinction between agency fees and taxes, nor is
there anything in the text of the First Amendment that suggests one.
The Court in Abood, Janus, and many other cases has vaguely hinted
at a historical argument, citing Jefferson’s objection “to compel[ling] a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves and abhors.”100 But in that quote Jefferson was
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
neutral taxes cannot be invalidated on the grounds that they pay for speech that the taxpayers
dislike. Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 229.
98 See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77
TUL. L. REV. 163, 189 (2002) (“The objection in Keller and Abood — that a single recipient used
dues to advance its own causes — is absent in the taxpayer situation, where general taxpayer funds
are used for a wide array of government speech purposes.”).
99 See, e.g., Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 88-21 (May 26, 1988) (discussing library taxing districts).
100 Jefferson, supra note 75 (emphasis omitted). Janus cited two additional historical sources, 138
S. Ct. at 2471 n.8, which did not discuss funding but simply criticized religious tests, oaths of allegiance, and the like. Oliver Ellsworth, The Landholder, VII., CONN. COURANT, Dec. 17, 1787,
reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 167, 167–71 (Paul
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specifically talking about the propagation of religious opinions,101 which
is regulated by a separate constitutional provision — the Establishment
Clause. And indeed, Establishment Clause precedent further proves our
point. Precedent forbids the government from requiring us to tithe to a
church.102 Yet it equally bars the government from selectively targeting
churches for gifts of tax funds as well.103 So the historical references
provide no particular support for the Court’s distinction between compelled direct payments and compelled payments that go through the
treasury.
Some people have defended the formal distinction by saying that coercively funded government speech is inevitable, but at least coercive
funding of private speech is not. And we do appreciate that constitutional rights shouldn’t be entirely rejected simply because they can’t be
completely protected. But the inevitability of coercively funded government speech should serve as a clue that coercively funded private speech
is not unconstitutional either.
This is especially so because coercion for government speech is so
common and so substantial. Average agency fee payers likely pay about
2% of their wages in agency fees,104 but the average tax burden (federal,
state, and local) is about 25%.105 Much of those tax payments will go
to activities that have at least as “powerful political and civic consequences”106 as the activities paid for by agency fees. Yet we see no Free
Speech Clause problems with those massive compelled payments for,
among other things, speech; it’s not just that we view this as deeply
regrettable but inevitable — the legal system views taxes as raising no
Free Speech Clause objections at all, whether the taxes go to speech or
anything else.107 That should make us doubt that there are First
Amendment problems with the much smaller compelled agency fees.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Leicester Ford ed., Historical Printing Club 1892); NOAH WEBSTER, On Test Laws, Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, and Partial Exclusions from Office, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND
FUGITIV WRITINGS 151, 151–53 (Boston, I. Thomas & E.T. Andrews 1790).
101 The quote was from his bill on religious freedom, and condemned fees that were used to
support religious teaching. Jefferson, supra note 75; see also David Luban, Taking out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 235 (2003) (similarly criticizing use of this Jefferson quote); Klass, supra note 76, at 1114.
102 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1947).
103 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
104 Sachs, supra note 29, at 1048.
105 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REVENUE STATISTICS 2017 — THE
UNITED STATES (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-united-states.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3XJ5-PFHZ].
106 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)).
107 Of course, some people morally object to taxation generally, or to taxation used for particular
purposes. But in our experience, they rarely distinguish taxes spent on speech from taxes spent on
other behavior — and the legal system certainly does not.
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Sometimes formal distinctions at least accomplish something symbolic, but we do not see that here either. Paying agency fees could be
seen by some as complicity in the actions that the union engages in using
those fees. But of course the same is routinely perceived by many when
it comes to taxes: “It is not a man’s duty . . . to devote himself to the
eradication of . . . even the most enormous wrong,” Thoreau wrote, “but
it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and . . . not to give it
practically his support” through the payment of taxes.108
Conversely, one could say that no one would reasonably view paying
taxes as endorsement of the government’s actions, precisely because everyone understands that people pay taxes because they have to. Yet exactly the same is true of agency fees.109 However we think about complicity in these contexts, we see no symbolic difference between
government coercion to pay money to others and government coercion
to pay money to the government so it can be paid to others (whether
government employees or recipients of government grants).
To be sure, the government spends money on more things than unions do (though unions spend it on many things, too). Some might therefore think that paying money to a government that is fighting a war
does not symbolize support for the war, but paying money to a union
symbolizes support for the union’s collective bargaining positions. But
from 1942 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1961, the federal government spent
the majority of its outlays on the military.110 Likewise, some local property taxes are specifically targeted to schools, which are chock full of
government speech that many people might deeply oppose.
More broadly, even if most people today don’t see compelled funding
of the federal government as symbolically expressing support of (say)
the War on Terror, surely the funding symbolically expresses support of
the federal government as an institution at least as much as compelled
agency fees symbolically express support of unions. Yet we do not perceive being forced to pay taxes as burdening people’s First Amendment
rights, even if they oppose the federal government as a whole (whether
because they think that it is particularly evil, or because they think all
government is evil). And this is so regardless of the symbolism they or
others may perceive from such a forced payment. The same should be
so for public employees being forced to pay agency fees.
So there seems to be no adequate reason — textual, historical, practical, or symbolic — for treating compelled payments differently depending on whether they pass through the treasury. And we can see this by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
108
109
110

HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A YANKEE IN CANADA 131 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1866).
See Gaebler, supra note 66.
“National defense” expenditure as a percentage of all outlays was over 70% throughout
America’s World War II years, nearly 90% in 1945, and nearly 70% from 1952 to 1954. See
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLE 3.1 — OUTLAYS BY SUPERFUNCTION
AND FUNCTION: 1940–2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/
49K3-XT6F].
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considering the many situations where the government requires people
to buy goods or services from private organizations, even though those
organizations can then use some of this compulsorily provided revenue
to express their views on whatever topics they please.
For instance, a public law school might require that applicants take
the LSAT, which would require them to pay money to the Law School
Admission Council. LSAC uses some of that money for speech, including research reports and public statements that many might see as imbued with ideological messages.111 And if the whole process of public
employee collective bargaining can itself be viewed as political, then the
LSAC’s entire mission — of measuring the future operators of the legal
system in particular ways, with an eye toward particular judgments of
quality and merit — can be seen as political, too. Yet there’s no First
Amendment problem with requiring public law school applicants to pay
the money to LSAC. Nor would applicants likely care whether they
had to pay the LSAC directly, or had to pay (say) the Department of
Education, which would then subcontract the task to LSAC.
Likewise, there’s no First Amendment problem with requiring drivers to pay money to auto insurance companies, requiring public university students to buy Apple computers,112 or requiring litigants to pay
opponents’ legal fees.113 The companies might well spend some of their
profits on lobbying, ideological advocacy, and even outright electioneering. But that compelled payment is not compelled speech. For the same
reason, there’s no First Amendment problem with requiring employees
to buy the services of a union, whether or not they like how their money
is spent.
C. Nothing New, from 1947 to Today
There is nothing fundamentally new in our position: Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan took much the same view nearly fifty years ago,
when they argued that agency fees for railroad employees (Machinists
v. Street) and mandatory bar dues for lawyers (Lathrop v. Donohue)
didn’t violate the First Amendment. In such situations, they reasoned,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
111 See Research Library, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, https://www.lsac.org/dataresearch/research [https://perma.cc/SE75-BM8X] (listing reports on, among other things, performance by race, sex, and ethnicity); LSAC Diversity Matters Grants, LAW SCH. ADMISSION
COUNCIL, https://www.lsac.org/members/lsac-grant-programs/lsac-diversity-matters-grants
[https://perma.cc/AZ7L-6J72] (promoting various grants for, among other things, “diversity outreach efforts”).
112 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Student Laptop Computer Requirement, UNIV.
OF CINCINNATI BLUE ASH COLL. (June 23, 2017), http://www.ucblueash.edu/content/dam/
ucblueash/docs/academics/academic-departments/emedia/2017-Laptop-FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EUB5-J28X].
113 Banning v. Newdow, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 453 (Ct. App. 2004); Post, supra note 66, at 210–
12 (discussing this example and offering others).
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No one’s desire or power to speak his mind is checked or curbed. The
individual member may express his views in any public or private forum as
freely as he could before the union collected his dues . . . .
. ...
. . . It is a commonplace of all organizations that a minority of a legally
recognized group may at times see an organization’s funds used for promotion of ideas opposed by the minority . . . . [For example,] the Federal
Government expends revenue collected from individual taxpayers to propagandize ideas which many taxpayers oppose.114

And indeed this position goes back still fifteen years more, to De
Mille v. American Federation of Radio Artists,115 a 1947 California
Supreme Court case. The plaintiff was the great director Cecil B.
DeMille, who was also a prominent political opponent of the labor
movement. DeMille had a radio program, the Lux Radio Theatre,
which required him to be a member of a union. The union assessed all
members a $1 fee that was used to oppose a California right-to-work
ballot measure. DeMille refused to pay, which got him ejected from the
union and lost him his $100,000 per year salary.116
DeMille sued, claiming this violated his First Amendment rights.
Unlike in Abood and Janus, there was no state action present: the $1
assessment was imposed and enforced just by the union. But the court
didn’t focus on the absence of state action, and instead squarely confronted the compelled speech argument.
DeMille had argued the $1 compelled payment “would be an expression on his part contrary to his personal beliefs,”117 which he argued was
unconstitutional under West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.118 The court disagreed, noting that Barnette had not concerned “payment of taxes assessed for the support of school districts requiring flag salute ceremonies”; had that been the issue in Barnette, the
court opined, “we doubt that the disposition would have been the
same.”119 And the court held that there was no right to be exempted
from such assessments, “else payment of a tax . . . could be avoided by
the mere assertion of beliefs . . . opposed to the accomplishment
thereof.”120
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
114 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 806, 808 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
accord Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 856–57 (1961) (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Post, supra note 66, at 210–12 (giving other examples).
115 187 P.2d 769 (Cal. 1947).
116 De Mille v. Am. Fed’n of Radio Artists, 175 P.2d 851, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946), aff’d, 187 P.2d
769.
117 De Mille, 187 P.2d at 775.
118 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
119 De Mille, 187 P.2d at 775 (emphasis added).
120 Id. at 776.
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This earlier view was right, we think, and Abood (and perhaps
Street) started us down a mistaken path — a path that leads logically to
Janus. True, much of what public employee unions do is political. Some
involves overtly ideological advocacy. Much involves at least taking
bargaining positions “that have powerful political and civic consequences.”121 But much of what government does is political, too.
The First Amendment does not protect us from having our money
forcibly taken — on threat of prison — to pay for governmental expression that we disagree with. Why then should it protect us from having
our money forcibly taken — on threat of being fired — to pay for union
expression that we disagree with? These are simply the consequences
of sharing a nation or a workplace with people who disagree with us.
D. Isn’t Money Speech?
Abood relied in part on an analogy to campaign finance law. Buckley
v. Valeo,122 the Court noted, held “that contributing to an organization
for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the First
Amendment”;123 and the Court concluded that, when it comes to agency
fees, “[t]he fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than
prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no
less an infringement of their constitutional rights.”124 This analogy, we
think, is misplaced.
Money is not speech, but restricting us from spending money to
speak restricts our speech — it makes it impossible for us to put up a
billboard, buy a newspaper ad, and the like.125 Likewise, restricting
newspapers from spending money to publish would restrict their free
press rights; restricting parents from spending money to educate their
children would restrict their parental rights; restricting people from
spending money on abortions would restrict their abortion rights; restricting criminal defendants from spending money on lawyers would
restrict their right to the assistance of counsel.126
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
121
122
123
124
125

Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1).
Id.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 338–41 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; see also Nixon
v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[A] decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern — not because money is speech
(it is not); but because it enables speech.”); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United
as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 421 (2013). We think the Court’s approach to campaign
finance speech restrictions is basically right. See Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically
Right, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095, 1101 (2002).
126 See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1988) (Stevens, J., writing for a unanimous
Court) (holding that the Free Speech Clause includes the right to pay people to circulate initiative
petitions); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (noting that “the
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But compelling us to give money does not appreciably restrict our
speech, other than by slightly reducing the amount of money we have
left over. Nor does compelling us to give money, without compelling us
to do more, compel us to speak or to believe. That is why the government can compel each of us to pay money to the treasury every year
even though it cannot require any of us to pledge allegiance to the government.127 No court would accept a challenge to a state property tax
on the grounds that it was equivalent to a pledge of allegiance to the
state or its school system, nor on the grounds that it left property owners
with less money to spend on billboards.128 That is because compelled
payment is neither compelled speech nor a speech restriction.
In Buckley, the Court did hold that the very act of contributing
money to a political cause can be symbolic expression, so restricting contributions restricts that symbolic expression and not just the recipient’s
ability to spend the money for speech.129 But the Court gave little
weight to this contributor interest in symbolic expression, and upheld
the limits on contributions.130 And whatever symbolism there might be
in voluntary political contributions, it would disappear for governmentcompelled payments, as shown by the countless exactions the legal system accepts without qualm.131
Now when it comes to religious exemption claims, such as under a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (state or federal), the analysis is different: requirements that people pay money — including for taxes —
may indeed count as a “substantial burden” on religious objectors.132
The objectors might still often be denied an exemption from such
requirements, on the theory that uniform administration of a tax

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Government [does not] deny that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be
represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire”).
127 See Gaebler, supra note 66, at 1020 (“[F]inancial support of an institution is a far less personal
or intimate endorsement of the institution or its principles than the reciting of a pledge or the giving
of a salute or even than the public display of a slogan or motto on one’s personal property.”).
128 See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 852 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
129 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21.
130 Id.; see also Klass, supra note 76, at 1118 (making a similar point). Subsequent cases have
recognized some challenges to contribution limits, but based on rationales unrelated to the symbolic
expression rationale (for example, by noting that unduly low limits interfere with the recipient’s
ability to effectively speak in the election campaign). See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1448–50 (2014) (plurality opinion); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246–62 (2006) (plurality opinion).
131 See Klass, supra note 76, at 1122–23 (“Buckley was right to recognize that voluntary payments
for the speech of others are often interpreted as symbolic acts of support, that they have an (albeit
limited) expressive content. But . . . our linguistic community does not interpret the payment of
mandatory assessments in the same way.”).
132 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014); see also United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
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law passes strict scrutiny;133 but the law would accept their sincere subjective claims that paying money that goes for evil purposes is itself
sinful.134
Yet that just reflects how religious exemption cases operate differently from free speech cases. Hobby Lobby got a federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act135 exemption from a regulation that compelled
employers to provide employees with certain kinds of medical benefits.136 But it doesn’t follow that such a compulsion violated the Free
Speech Clause rights of all employers who disapproved of it. Refusal to
pay money might be a religious practice, and compelling payments
might substantially burden religious practice; but it doesn’t follow that
refusal to pay money is speech, or that compelling the payment of money
is compelled speech.
E. Contributions to Political Parties
We thus think that the government can compel us to fund others’
speech just as permissibly as it can speak directly (with our money).
This leads to the question: Are there things that the government indeed
can’t say or support directly, so that even under our view the government can’t compel people to subsidize them?
We mentioned above the only area where the answer is clearly “yes”
under current doctrine: religious advocacy, which is constrained by the
Establishment Clause. The government can’t convey sufficiently religious views itself137 or selectively give taxpayer funds to have such views
conveyed.138 Likewise, the government would likely be barred by the
Establishment Clause from deducting funds from employee paychecks
and transferring them directly to a religious organization for the same
forbidden uses.
Some Justices have suggested that there is a second area where the
government is barred from spending money: to support a particular political party. Justice Black argued in Street that “[p]robably no one
would suggest” that the First Amendment would let workers be taxed
“to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups
favored by the Government to elect their candidates or promote their
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
133
134
135

See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777–79.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012), invalidated as to state and local laws by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
136 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780–83.
137 See McCreary County. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 878–81 (2005).
138 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995). The exact rule for when government grants
can and can’t be spent for religious purposes is complicated, but we won’t focus on it here.
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controversial causes.”139 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan apparently
accepted this position.140
Likewise, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,141 Justices
Scalia and Thomas agreed that the government could not “promote
candidates nominated by the Republican Party,” but denied that “that
unconstitutionality has anything to do with the First Amendment.”142
Some courts have suggested that the protection might stem from
the Guarantee Clause.143 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan thought
that government spending that creates “risks of governmental selfperpetuation . . . might justify the recognition of a Constitutional protection against the ‘establishment’ of political beliefs.”144
The Court has never had occasion to decide whether such a doctrine
exists. Yet if it does exist, it would have to be narrowly limited to the
(very rare) government support of particular political parties, political
candidates, and perhaps (though perhaps not) ballot measures.145
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
139
140
141
142

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 853 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
524 U.S. 569 (1998).
Id. at 598 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), Justice Rehnquist argued that a city should have broad latitude to
choose who may use its property (in that case, a city-owned theater), but “cannot unfairly discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,” for instance by opening property “to Republicans
while closing [it] to Democrats,” id. at 572 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Perhaps Justice Scalia
took a similar view toward supplying funds in Finley as Justice Rehnquist did to opening access
to physical space — though then one would have to have a theory for why discrimination based on
party affiliation (say, the government endorsing the Republican candidate) violates the Equal Protection Clause but discrimination based on viewpoint (say, the government endorsing pro-recycling
messages) does not.
143 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1107–08 (E.D. Cal. 2003); Burt
v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985).
144 Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 853 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
145 See Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 625–26, 625 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding advocacy
of ballot measure constitutional, though advocacy of a particular candidate would be unconstitutional); Cook v. Baca, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1227–29 (D.N.M. 2000) (holding advocacy of ballot
measure constitutional), aff’d for reasons given below, 12 F. App’x 640, 641 (10th Cir. 2001); Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery Cty., 132 A.3d 311, 323–27 (Md. 2016) (holding advocacy of
ballot measure constitutional); Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 915 P.2d 336, 339 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting that other authorities have found “support in the constitution for the general proposition
that, at some threshold level, a public entity must refrain from spending public funds to promote a
partisan position during an election campaign”); Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist:
When the Government Is the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 256–59 (2011) (arguing for the constitutionality of government speech supporting ballot measure, but not candidate,
campaigns). Several cases hold that advocacy of a particular ballot measure is unauthorized under
state or municipal law. See, e.g., D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 11
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1976); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d
628, 634 (Mass. 1978); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Bd. of Educ., 98 A.2d 673, 677–78 (N.J.
1953) (Brennan, J.). One case holds that advocacy of a ballot measure violates the Delaware
Constitution’s provision that “[a]ll elections shall be free and equal.” Young v. Red Clay Consol.
Sch. Dist., 122 A.3d 784, 797 (Del. Ch. 2015) (opinion of Laster, V.C.) (alteration in original) (quoting
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 3); id. at 858–59.
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Such a doctrine could not support a more general limit on government ideological speech, which is commonplace. Governments are generally not barred from speaking out for or against legislative actions.146
Indeed, the President is expressly authorized to recommend legislation;147 other executive officials, state and federal, routinely do the same;
so do federal and state judiciaries;148 so do cities and counties.149 Similarly, nothing forbids the government from funding controversial causes
like Planned Parenthood or crisis pregnancy centers (as some governments do150) or, if it wished, funding the National Rifle Association or
the American Civil Liberties Union.
So if this doctrine exists, it could only limit compelled subsidies to a
modest extent: if the government can’t itself speak in favor of or fund
political parties or candidates, the government can’t require people to
give money that gets spent in support of those parties or candidates.151
But in our view nothing would prevent the government from compelling
all of us to pay sums that get spent on an ideological cause — for or
against abortion, gun regulation, environmentalism, or anything else.
Because the government can support these causes directly, it can support
them indirectly. That some of us might find some of these actions objectionable is just a reminder that the government can do many objectionable things in our name.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
146
147
148

See, e.g., Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 287 (4th Cir. 2008).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2.
See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
7–8, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
595C-QB25] (asking Congress to provide more funding and confirm more judges).
149 See, e.g., Membership, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/membership
[https://perma.cc/7RK6-NA6T] (noting that dues paid by cities help pay for “[f]ederal [a]dvocacy”
with congressional offices); see also Burkhardt v. Lindsay, 811 F. Supp. 2d 632, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(discussing municipal lobbying).
150 See, e.g., PLANNED PARENTHOOD EMPIRE STATE ACTS, TESTIMONY OF PLANNED
PARENTHOOD EMPIRE STATE ACTS BEFORE THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET HEARING
ON HEALTH AND MEDICAID 3–4 (2018), https://nyassembly.gov/write/upload/publichearing/
000864/001546.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4G2-32VF]; SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV. OF MINORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 108TH CONG., REP. ON THE CONTENT OF
FEDERALLY FUNDED ABSTINENCE-ONLY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 13 (2004), http://spot.
colorado.edu/~tooley/HenryWaxman.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB7N-QL9J].
151 We’re speaking here of governmental favoritism based on a candidate’s or party’s ideology;
government-funded programs through which rival parties and candidates can convey their views
would remain constitutional. See Libertarian Party of Ind. v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981, 989 (7th Cir.
1984) (expressly rejecting an Abood-based objection to a public campaign funding program, on the
grounds that “the funds are not considered to be contributing to the spreading of a political message,
but rather are advancing an important public interest, the facilitation of ‘public discussion and
participation in the electoral process’” (citation omitted)). Some cases reject constitutional challenges to such programs without discussing Abood-like challenges. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998) (publicly funded debates); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 90–108 (1976) (public financing of political campaigns); Clark v. Burleigh, 841 P.2d 975, 987–88
(Cal. 1992) (ballot pamphlets containing candidate statements).

194

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:171

All this means that the hypothetical doctrine prohibiting government
electoral speech could support a narrow limit on agency fees — but the
effect would be much more like that of Abood than of Janus, and indeed
more modest than that of Abood. Unions would need to avoid using
agency fees to support or oppose particular parties or candidates, or perhaps particular ballot measures. But they would remain free to use
agency fees for collective bargaining (as under Abood152) and even for
ideological expenditures to promote the same kinds of causes that the
government can itself promote.
Thus, for instance, the teachers’ union public relations campaign
aimed at praising the teaching profession, which Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass’n153 held could not be paid for with agency fees,154 should
have posed no First Amendment problems. The government can spend
tax money to promote Teacher Appreciation Week; a union should be
free to spend agency fees to do the same.
And of course it remains quite possible that there is no such doctrine
at all, and that the government is free to support not only causes but
also candidates, however unfair that may seem. It remains quite unsettled, for instance, whether the First Amendment — or another constitutional provision — restricts governmental drawing of districts designed
to entrench a particular political party.155 Likewise, it is far from clear
that there is a broader rule against government speech designed to entrench a party. Perhaps the only constraints on such government speech
are political, not legal.
III. THE EFFECTS OF JANUS
Janus has been seen as hugely consequential, but we suspect its effects will be more complex than many anticipate. For instance, it is not
at all clear that Janus will have any effect on private labor unions.
Though Abood’s predecessors, like Street, discussed a First Amendment
problem with even private labor unions exacting agency fees, they rested
on a broad conception of the state action doctrine that is out of favor
today156 — as the Janus majority expressly noted.157 It seems more
likely that at least some members of the Janus majority would conclude
that private labor unions that agree with private employers to exact
agency fees are not regulated by the First Amendment.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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154

See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225–26 (1977).
500 U.S. 507 (1991).
Id. at 528–29 (Blackmun, J., writing for four Justices); id. at 559 (Scalia, J., writing for four
other Justices, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
155 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–29 (2018).
156 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 849–51 (2012); Joseph E. Slater, Will Labor Law Prompt Conservative Justices to Adopt a Radical Theory of State Action?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 62, 68–94 (2017).
157 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 n.24.
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Nor is it clear that Janus will have a major long-term effect on even
the law governing public sector unions — outside of transition costs —
because (as we will discuss shortly in section III.A) it seems to preserve
the possibility of direct payments to unions by the government, and of
the government speech doctrine more generally. But Janus will likely
affect funding for supposedly private speech, such as activities of bar
associations and university student groups. And it raises the serious
possibility of retroactive liability that could make the transition costs
costly indeed.
A. Government Speech vs. Private Speech
We have argued that governments remain free to directly support
public sector unions using taxpayer dollars, and that this possibility undercuts the logic of Janus. After Janus, we suspect that at least some
jurisdictions will switch to this regime. But now that Janus has been
decided, might the Court ride the analogy down the opposite side of the
slope and conclude that even direct government funding of unions is
unconstitutional?
We suppose it’s possible, but we very much doubt it. Government
speech and support for speech are ubiquitous, and have been allowed in
various forms by the Court. For instance, the Court has unanimously
concluded that university curriculum choices are likely government
speech, and taxpayers have no constitutional right to be exempted from
funding them.158 It has upheld, as government speech, advertising campaigns promoting particular products and denied a constitutional right
to be exempted from paying assessments to fund them.159 And it has
unanimously agreed that the government can speak by allowing certain
monuments in public parks but not others.160
To the extent there is controversy about the boundaries of the doctrine, the controversy is generally over when something stops being government speech and becomes a limited public forum devoted to private
speech.161 Though the Janus majority did not cite these government
speech cases, it stressed that it was condemning governmental funding
of “private speech.”162 We suspect this distinction will remain key.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
158 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 (2000); id. at
242–43 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
159 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557–67 (2005).
160 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–73 (2009); id. at 485 (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment) (agreeing that in the instant case the government’s act was permissible speech).
161 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion); Walker v. Tex. Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2254–63 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting as to the
majority’s determination that the speech at issue was government speech rather than private
speech).
162 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (opening paragraph of majority); id. at 2464.
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We therefore doubt that Janus will have much effect, for example,
on the series of decisions about agricultural marketing orders that occupied the Court from 1997 to 2005. The orders involved assessments
imposed on agricultural producers and used by state or federal governments to pay for generic promotion (for example, “Buy California Summer Fruits”). The Court upheld one such scheme in Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.163 and struck down another in United
States v. United Foods, Inc.,164 but ultimately held in Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass’n that these orders were permissible so long as
they were crafted as government speech.165 This is likely to remain
accepted, even after Janus; Janus will mostly affect programs construed
as promoting private speech, such as bar dues and student activities.
B. Bar Dues
Compulsory bar dues have long been treated the same as public employee union agency fees. In Lathrop v. Donohue, the Court held that
lawyers can be required to pay such dues,166 but in Keller v. State Bar
of California, the Court held that the dues couldn’t be used for political
advocacy that wasn’t “germane” to “the State’s interest in regulating the
legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.”167 Keller
thus tracks the old Abood rule, in which dues could be required but only
for certain purposes.168
Now that public employees can’t be required to pay money at all to
unions, we think the Court will say that lawyers can’t be required to
pay it to state bars either. After all, speech by the state bar is as likely
as speech by unions to “touch fundamental questions of . . . policy,”169
and more broadly to “have powerful political and civic consequences,”170
even when it just has to do with regulating the legal profession.
As with agency fees, we think this would extend a mistake. The
First Amendment should not constrain bars’ use of dues.
Indeed, we think this should be even more clear than with agency
fees, because it is more logical to see a state bar as an agency of the state
government, as the California Supreme Court had held in Keller.171 The
California Bar is an agency expressly authorized by the California
Constitution172 and, at the time, was run by a Board of Governors that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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521 U.S. 457, 467–77 (1997).
533 U.S. 405, 409–17 (2001).
544 U.S. 550, 557–59 (2005).
367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality opinion).
496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990).
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977).
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2476.
Id. at 2464.
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1025–29 (Cal. 1989), rev’d, 496 U.S. 1.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
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was partly appointed by the state governor and partly elected by state
bar members.173
The U.S. Supreme Court, though, concluded that a state bar didn’t
qualify as a government speaker for First Amendment purposes. Since
Keller, the Court has made clear that this determination turned on one
critical fact: “[T]he state bar’s communicative activities to which the
plaintiffs objected were not prescribed by law in their general outline
and not developed under official government supervision.”174 When, on
the other hand, “the government sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated,” it is free to use
compulsory fees to convey the message, even when the details of the
message are produced with “assistance from nongovernmental
sources.”175
Yet this seems to us an oddly crabbed view of how “official government supervision”176 can operate. Indeed, in the federal government,
messages are generally set by executive agencies (for example, the
Department of Agriculture in Johanns), though occasionally by the judiciary or by Congress. But state governments have a very different
approach to separation of powers. Among other things, they often have
(1) subordinate political subdivisions, including ones in which only particular kinds of property owners can vote,177 and (2) various government
agencies that are appointed by a mix of officials from various branches
of government.178
Why should these agencies — and, in particular a state bar that is
governed by a mix of gubernatorial appointees and directors elected by
California lawyers — be treated differently for First Amendment
purposes than agencies that have more direct federal analogues? As
Johanns itself acknowledges, there is no difference for First Amendment
purposes between speech funded by an income, property, or sales tax
and speech funded by a tax levied on a particular occupation.179 Why
should there be a First Amendment difference based on the way in
which the supervisors of the speaking organization are appointed or
elected?
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
173 Six were gubernatorial appointees, fifteen were elected by state bar members, and one was
elected by the directors of the Young Lawyers section of the bar. Keller, 767 P.2d at 1024.
174 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730 (1973).
178 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 19 (medical marijuana licensing commission); MD.
CONST. art. II, § 21A (gubernatorial salary commission); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (state board of
higher education); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, para. 5 (state council on unfunded mandates, empowered to essentially eliminate unfunded state mandates on local subdivisions); N.Y. CONST. art.
VI, § 2, subdivs. c–d (judicial nominating commission); OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1 (redistricting
commission).
179 See 544 U.S. at 562–63.
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The oddness of Keller becomes even plainer when one considers that
some state bars — such as the California bar since 2018 — are governed
entirely by appointees of elected executive, legislative, and judicial officeholders.180 That looks to us like an eminently official government
body, which would thus provide “official government supervision.”181
We thus think that the restructured California bar should be viewed
as a fully governmental speaker for First Amendment purposes, and
thus outside the constraints of Keller. Yet we would have thought the
same about the original California bar, which included lawyer-elected
trustees as well as those appointed by the Governor.182 Perhaps then
our predictions can’t be trusted, and both partly elected state bars and
entirely government-official-appointed state bars will be forbidden from
demanding that lawyers pay any dues.
C. Public University Student Government Activity Fees
In Southworth, the Court unanimously upheld a public university’s
requirement that students pay a $330 “student activity fee” that would
then be distributed to student groups through the student government.183 The Court concluded that the case was analogous to Abood
and Keller, but that “[t]he standard of germane speech” applied in those
cases “is unworkable” when it comes to university student group funding, given the “vast, unexplored bounds” of the speech that universities
generally subsidize.184 Because of this, the Court upheld the program
to the extent that it funded student groups viewpoint-neutrally.185
But Janus took the opposite approach to the difficulty of identifying
what speech is “germane” to a government program — Janus held that,
when such a line is “impossible to draw with precision,”186 the solution
is to reject all such compulsory funding of speech, not to allow all such
compulsory funding. Applying the same logic to student activity fees,
then, all such fees would need to be held unconstitutional: if “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers raises
similar First Amendment concerns”187 to compelling speech, then that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
180 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6010–6013.5 (West Supp. 2018) (providing for five trustees
appointed by the California Supreme Court, four by the Governor, and four by legislative leaders).
181 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. Nor do we think it should matter whether the messages are “prescribed by law in their general outline.” Id. (emphasis added). The presence of a specific legislative
command may be relevant under other constitutional doctrines, but we see no reason why it should
matter to the free speech doctrine applied to the states.
182 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Cal. 1989), rev’d, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
183 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221–22 (2000).
184 Id. at 231–32.
185 Id. at 233–34.
186 138 S. Ct. at 2481.
187 Id. at 2464.
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would be as improper when students are compelled to subsidize student
groups as when employees are compelled to subsidize employee groups.
Now three of the Justices in Southworth — Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer — would have upheld student fees for broader reasons than
did the majority. They concluded that the dissenting students’ “objection has less force than it might otherwise carry because the challenged
fees support a government program that aims to broaden public discourse.”188 And they noted that students must pay tuition, which the
government can use for all sorts of speech that students disapprove of,
and that “[s]ince uses of tuition payments . . . may fund offensive speech
far more obviously than the student activity fee does, it is difficult to see
how the activity fee could present a stronger argument for a refund.”189
But these arguments do not fit well with the Janus majority. If requiring people to fund speech they disapprove of is similar to “coerc[ing
them] into betraying their convictions,” and thus “demeaning,”190 then
that would happen whether the compelled payment is aimed at
“broaden[ing] public discourse”191 or at some other purpose. And while
universities constantly use tuition funds for speech students may object
to, likewise the government constantly uses tax revenues for speech taxpayers may object to. If this power to use taxes to speak does not include the power to use much lower compelled agency fees to support
speech, then it’s hard to see how the power to use tuition payments to
speak includes the power to use much lower activity fees to support
speech.
The three concurring Justices in Southworth also argued that “the
relationship between the fee payer and the ultimately objectionable expression is far more attenuated,” because the student fees flow through
“a distributing agency [the student government] having itself no social,
political, or ideological character.”192 Likewise, they reasoned that “the
disbursements, varying from year to year, are as likely as not to fund an
organization that disputes the very message an individual student finds
exceptionable.”193
But these positions are hard to sustain factually. In practice, at a
typical public university the student government will indeed have a “social, political, or ideological character,” and most funded groups will be
on one side of the political spectrum. We suspect that at most public
universities that will be the left side — but even if at some it is the right
side, there’s little reason to think that all or even most universities will
be politically balanced.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Southworth, 529 U.S. at 240–41 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 243.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 240–41 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 240.
Id.
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Perhaps for these reasons, the concurrence’s arguments did not persuade any of the other Justices at the time, and they now seem even less
likely to persuade members of the Janus majority. Southworth thus
seems to be in jeopardy.
Yet public universities that want to keep funding student groups can
easily avoid this problem, simply by folding the student activity fee into
the tuition, and then funding the student groups out of that tuition. The
Court acknowledged in Southworth that, “[i]f the challenged speech here
were financed by tuition dollars and the University and its officials were
responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on the premise
that the government itself is the speaker.”194 Johanns strengthens that
hypothesis to a near certainty.
And of course this wouldn’t be limited to situations where the university necessarily endorses the supported viewpoints: universities routinely use tuition funds (or tax funds) to support guest speakers (either
one at a time or on panels aimed at presenting contrasting views), even
when the university may not agree with all the speakers. We know of
no cases suggesting that such funding of university-invited speakers
would violate the First Amendment rights of taxpayers or tuition payers.
We likewise think the university is free to pay for speakers invited by
student groups.
Nor should there be much of a political barrier to this change.
Though eye-popping tuition numbers sometimes provoke bad press, student activity fees are small; most students won’t care whether they have
to pay a $30,330 tuition check or $30,000 tuition plus a $330 student
activity fee. Student governments might dislike having the university
more involved in the day-to-day funding, but they should prefer this
over losing the mandatory fee.
The universities might prefer for political reasons to have minimal
interaction with controversial speakers invited by student groups. But
universities have — or at least should have — a good deal of experience
explaining to the public that hosting and even subsidizing a wide range
of speakers doesn’t mean agreeing with the speakers’ viewpoints.195
The accounting treatment of student funding seems unlikely to make
that explanation more or less persuasive.
So if universities think that subsidizing student groups’ speaker invitations is academically valuable, they will be able to keep doing that.
Here, even more clearly than as to agency fees, Janus might mean a
change in accounting but not in substance.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 229 (majority opinion).
See Jacob T. Levy (@jtlevy), TWITTER (Apr. 20, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://twitter.com/
jtlevy/status/987393758877515776 [https://perma.cc/W96F-V82M].
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D. Union Liability Under Janus
Finally, Janus may seriously affect unions themselves. Of course unions will have to change their future behavior, but Janus may also lead
to liability now for money they collected last year. In holding unconstitutional the agency fees on which most public employee unions rely,
Janus makes it likely that they can be sued for substantial damages under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The case for liability has three key steps. First, under standard civil
retroactivity doctrine, Supreme Court decisions supposedly state the
true law as it has always been, rather than changing the law. While the
Court briefly experimented with other more limited forms of retroactivity,196 black letter law is now that:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of
the rule.197

This means that courts must treat the involuntary collection of agency
fees before Janus as unconstitutional.
Second, unions collecting agency fees are acting “under color” of state
law,198 thanks to precedents like Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.199 Lugar
held that private debt collectors could be sued under § 1983 for making
use of an unconstitutional state statute that allowed the attachment of
property without due process.200 So long as the private debt collectors
“invok[ed] the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created
attachment procedures,” they were liable for unconstitutional behavior
under that statute.201
Union collection of now-unconstitutional agency fees appears analogous. The state statutes authorizing the collection of agency fees202 are
unconstitutional state action, just as in Lugar. And the unions “invoked
the aid of state officials” to collect those fees, just as in Lugar.203 They
too will be liable.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
196 See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105–08 (1971); see also Huiyi Chen, Comment, Balancing Implied Fundamental Rights and Reliance Interests: A Framework for Limiting
the Retroactive Effects of Obergefell in Property Cases, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1417, 1433–36 (2016)
(tracing doctrine).
197 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
198 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
199 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
200 Id. at 934.
201 Id. at 942.
202 See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e) (2016), invalidated by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.
203 In Illinois, for example, as in many states, the state employer will automatically deduct agency
fees from the employees’ paychecks. Id.
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Third, unions do not have the qualified immunity defense that is
available to government § 1983 defendants. Private entities are generally not immune unless they are performing a government function or
acting on behalf of the government.204 Indeed, in Wyatt v. Cole,205 the
Court specifically rejected a qualified immunity defense for private parties who had availed themselves of unconstitutional state statutes.206 It
therefore anticipated and allowed that a private party could simultaneously be subject to liability under Lugar without being entitled to any
countervailing immunity.207 That is the unions’ new bind as well.
Moreover, since Janus requires nonmembers to “affirmatively consent” to all agency fees (and requires such consent to be “shown by ‘clear
and compelling’ evidence”),208 the potential claimants are many. They
could include all nonmembers who paid agency fees, and might even
include union members, if the members could show that the threat of
the unconstitutional nonmember agency fees caused them to join the
union. If these suits could be brought as class actions — which is unclear209 — then the liability could be substantial.
The only sure limit on such suits is the statute of limitations. Under
§ 1983, the statute of limitations varies by state and follows that state’s
statute of limitations for personal injury torts.210 In most states this will
be two or three years.211 Liability for all agency fees for nonmembers
may thus add up to about 10–20% of a union’s annual revenue.212
To be sure, this kind of retroactive liability can seem quite unfair,
especially when the unions were following Supreme Court precedent.213
And the unions may well have defenses to mitigate that unfairness. For
example, they might argue that damages should be sharply reduced because employees received valuable services in exchange for their agency
fees. Or they might argue that a permissible alternative scheme would
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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have led to the same payments, making the damages arguably nominal.214 Still, the apparent premise of Janus is that agency fees work a
unique First Amendment injury, and while these First Amendment
damages must be limited to “plaintiffs’ actual losses,” they can still include intangible nonmonetary losses.215
As an alternative, plaintiffs may also be able to pursue claims for
restitution and unjust enrichment, somewhat analogous both to claims
for the refund of unconstitutional taxes and to payments under a judicial
order that has since been reversed.216 The exact boundaries of these
claims are complex, but they could well lead to some liability.
Post-Janus suits against unions could also provide the setting for an
“affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause,”217 or a
new remedial twist to the Court’s civil retroactivity doctrine.218 Indeed,
some lower courts have given private parties a good faith defense to
suits under § 1983, to eliminate the apparent unfairness created by the
combination of Wyatt and Lugar.219 A few lawsuits brought against
unions under Harris v. Quinn220 (a precursor to Janus) were dismissed
by the lower courts on such grounds.221
But unions still should not be too confident that they will have such
a defense against Janus suits. First, this good faith defense has never
been endorsed by the Supreme Court, and there is little clear authority
for it. If one of the cases makes it to the Court, there is no guarantee
that the Justices will recognize the defense. And if the Court turns to
private law analogues for such a defense, it might find that restitution
and unjust enrichment provide the better analogue.
Second, these particular suits may present a particularly unsympathetic vehicle to the Court. In a discussion of union reliance on Abood,
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the Court’s opinion in Janus specifically noted that “public-sector unions
have been on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings about
Abood”222 and opined that, since 2012, “any public-sector union seeking
an agency-fee provision in a collective-bargaining agreement must have
understood that the constitutionality of such a provision was uncertain.”223 So even if such a good faith defense were recognized, the courts
may well conclude that unions were knowingly gambling on the continued validity of Abood, and therefore cannot complain about their losses.
CONCLUSION
Being forced to pay money to objectionable causes is a fact of life,
not a First Amendment problem. But for decades, many people have
assumed the contrary, and found serious First Amendment burdens in
such compelled subsidies. Janus takes that (incorrect) assumption to its
logical conclusion.
That may not be the final implication either. Assuming similar conclusions extend to other areas of law, existing arrangements for state bar
dues and student activity fees, for example, may change as well. And
because Janus can lead to surprisingly retroactive liability, universities
and bar associations should be proactive. They should consider changing their methods of collection now, to limit the damage as fast as they
can.
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